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Abstract. We propose an access control scheme for developing authorization rules for XML documents, allowing flexible data granularity and
authorization propagation. To simplify the complex access control policies in XML, we introduce a new tool: Authorization Policy Sheet (APS).
Complex access control rules can be easily described in an APS. The
administrator of a system can easily manage the access control of the
system. With aid of Data Type Definitions(DTD), the policies given in
an APS can be converted into a standard XML code that can be implemented in a normal XML environment.
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Introduction

Using eXtensible Markup Language has brought profound changes in the nature
of information and the usability of the Web. XML can conveniently represent
document structure and contents and offers great control over information granularity via transformation and query languages. As XML becomes a widespread
data encoding format for Web applications, the Web resource protection must
follow to withstand increasing threats from Internet hackers.
One important mechanism to protect Web contents is Access Control. An
access control service is needed when some people want to block or allow access
to an entire XML instance, while others would like to control access at the tag
level. Developing an access control model, and related mechanism, in terms of
XML is an important step. With the rapid development of web environments
XML data access control has been intensively studied (e.g., [2, 8, 4, 5, 3, 1, 7]).
However, these existing research works on XML do not offer more advanced
access control features such as authorization delegation and propagation.
The popular mechanism in XML based access control takes advantage of
Data Type Definitions (DTD) (e.g., [1]). With a DTD based approach, the access control rules are defined in DTD. A DTD based approach is sometimes
employed along with a customized XML access control language where the rules
are described using the language [6]. The merit of this kind of scheme is that
the system administrator can enter/update access control rules much more conveniently.

In practice, access control components come with an order. For example,
an order could be: super user > group member > others, where super user
holds the highest privilege and others hold the least privilege. In objects, an
order can be associated with the depth the objects reside in a tree or a directory.
Access control in such systems implies the propagation of authorization in terms
of the associated order. In this paper, we present a novel framework for fine grain
XML access control that includes delegation and propagation of authorization,
in terms of the partial order of access control components. With our scheme,
the complicated assess control task in XML documents becomes easy, since we
propose a novel access control “spreadsheet” tool for describing rules. We call it
Authorization Policy Sheet (APS). Using an APS with the associated DTD forms
a normal XML code that is understandable to a normal XML environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
access control model and define the major components in our model. In Section
3, we present the authorization policy sheet (APS), which forms the foundation
to our model. In Section 4, we provide the definitions of predicates. In Section 4,
we introduce the authorization propagation. The final section is the conclusion.
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Basic Definitions

In this section, we define our access control model. We give the definitions of
DTD, APS, and associated system components including subjects, objects, authorization rights, and types.
2.1

Document Type Definition (DTD)

A Document Type Declaration can be attached to XML file and specifies the
rules or Document Type Definition (DTD) that XML file may follow. A DTD
consists of two parts: the element declarations and the attributions. The element
declarations part specifies the structure of the elements contained in the document. The attribute list declarations part specifies the list of its attributes, in
terms of names, types, optionally clause, and default values.
2.2

Subject

A subject is active. It could be a user or a processor. A subject has a name and
other associated information dependent on the application. We require subjects
to be either ordered with a proper order or unordered when the order of subjects
are insignificant.
Subject Set. Subject constant poset (S, >): admin, s1 , s2 , · · · , sn denote ordered subjects with the order of admin > s1 > s2 > · · · > sn . We assume that
the administrator possesses the highest privilege.
A subject can be defined according to the need. For example, a subject could
be described by set of attributes such as name, address, rights, etc. As the
simplest example, in DTD, the subject is defined as:

<!DOCTYPE subject[
<!ELEMENT
subject
<!ELEMENT
users
<!ELEMENT
name
]>

(users*)>
(name)>
#PCDATA>

The attribute to the above subject set contains only the usernames.
Here is the example of the subject hierarchy with three subjects (Admin,
Alice, Bob), described in a separate sheet:
<subject>
<users>
<name> Admin </name>
</users>
<users>
<name> Alice </name>
</users>
<users>
<name> Bob </name>
</users>
</subject>
We have omitted “partial order” of the associated subjects such as Admin >
Bob > Alice as this will be presented later on.
Object Objects are passive. They could be files, programs, tables, etc. Objects
are represented by a constant poset (O,>): o1 , o2 , · · · with the order o1 > o2 , > ...
The object is described as target + path(V, E), where target is an XML
document or URL address, path is an XPath expression that eventually selects
specific portions (object) of the XML document in the XML tree where V is a
set of nodes and E is a set of edges. The structure of the objects could be defined
in the DTD as follows.
<!DOCTYPE
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
]>

object[
object
target
path

(target,path)>
href #PCDATA>
#PCDATA>

Here is the example of the object hierarchy described in a separate XML
sheet:
<object>
<object>
<target> hospital.xml </target>
<path>//doctor/operation_info</path>
</object>

<object>
<target> hospital.xml </target>
<path>//doctor/personnel_info/alice </path>
</object>
</object>
Access Rights Ordered access rights are defined as constant poset (A, >):
a1 , a2 , · · · with the order: a1 > a2 > ... For example, Read > Write > Executable.
They are defined in DTD as follows.
<!DOCTYPE access_right[
<!ELEMENT access_right (a*) #IMPLIED>
]>
Authorization Type Authorization type is given by the constant set T =
{n, p, d}, where
– n: the access right is forbidden.
– p: specifies the access right is granted.
– d: specifies the access right is delegable.
The ordered authorization types are described in DTD:
<!DOCTYPE authorization_type[
<!ELEMENT authorization_type (n|p|d) #REQUIRED>
]>
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Authorization Policy Sheet

Directly using XML to describe access control often shows little advantage when
the access control system is complicated (e.g., when authorization delegation and
propagation are required). In our model, authorization specifications or rules
are provided in an Authorization Policy Sheet (APS) associated with the document/DTD. In APS, the representation of authorizations is described in terms
of
1. Orders of the objects and subjects,
2. Explicit authorization rules.
The APS is separate from the document and DTD and offers great convenience in the administration of access control for system administrators due to
its simplicity. The system administrator can manage the system access control
by the concise rules given in an APS. The resultant XML sheet can be generated
from the corresponding DTD and APS. APS also shows the great advantage due
to its convenience in the specification of explicit rights and the implicit rights
for XML documents.

3.1

Rules

An APS sheet consists of a finite set of rules. A rule consists of name, head and
attribute. When the head of a rule is an authorization predicate, the rule is called
authorization rule. For a set of rules named r, each rule consists of a predicate
and an attribute:
<rule:r>
<p1, attribute> <- <condition>
<p2, attribute> <- <condition>
<p3, attribute> <- <condition>
<pn, attribute> <- <condition>
</rule:r>
Here, p1, p2,...,pn are a set of predicates and attribute denotes the components associated with the predicate. condition denotes the condition with
respect to the rule of a predicate. Due to the space limit, we will omit the details
in this paper and will present it in the full version of the paper.
The structure of rule in DTD is defined as following:
<!DOCTYPE rule[
<!ELEMENT
rule
(predicate+,condition*)>
<!ELEMENT
predicate (grant, cangrant ) #IMPLIED>
<!ELEMENT
condition (gran, cangrant)*>
]>
A rule in XML is defined as following:
<rule:r>
<predicate,attribute, ...,attribute>
...
<condition>
...
</condition>
</rule:r>
3.2

Partial Order

The partial orders of the access control components, including subjects, object,
types, and rights, are one of the key components in an APS. We will see that
they can be used to simplify our access control system by implicit rules in authorization propagations. In an APS, the partial orders are respectively defined
in the form:
s1
o1
t1
a1

>
>
>
>

s2
o2
t2
a2

>
>
>
>

s2
o3
t3
a3

>
>
>
>

...
...
...
...
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Predicates

Predicates form the essential part of an APS. In our system, there is a set of
predicates:
P = {p1 , p2 , ...., pn }.

Every predicate is constructed in the form < pi , x1 , ...., xn >. x1 , ..., xn are terms
associated with the predicate. We utilize following predicates in an APS.

4.1

grant

Definition 1. (grant) grant is a 6-tuple predicate S × O × T × A × S × F :
< grant, s, o, t, a, g, f >, where subject s ∈ S is granted by grantor g ∈ G the
access right a ∈ A on object o ∈ O with the type t ∈ T . It determines whether a
subject is granted an access right over an object. In an APS, this rule reads:

<grant grantee=" ", target+path=" ", authorization_type=" ",
access_right=" ", grantor=" ", status=" ">

Predicate grant in APS is an authorization rule, where the element grant
has attributes grantee; target + path(V, E), target is an XML or DTD, path
is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the
XML document in XML tree where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges,
authorization type, access rights, grantor, and status. status is a flag
indicating whether or not the rule is effective.
For example,
The merit of grant in ASP is obvious. The grant is also defined in DTD as
follows.

<!DOCTYPE
<!ELEMENT

grant[
grant

<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT

subject
grantee
name

(subject,object,authorization_type,
access_right,subject,status)>
(grantee)>
(name)>
#PCDATA>

<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT

object
target
path

(target,path)>
href #PCDATA>
#PCDATA>

<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT

authorization_type (n|p|d) #REQUIRED>
access_right (a*) #IMPLIED>
a
#PCDATA>

<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT

subject
grantor
name

(grantor)>
(name)>
#PCDATA>

<!ELEMENT
]>

status

(true|false) #REQUIRED>

The grant rule defined in ASP and DTD is converted into a standard form
of XML. Here is an example of grant in APS and XML:
– rule in APS:
<rule:hospital>
<grant, grantee="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Read",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">
</rule:hospital>
– rule converted to XML:
<rule:hospital>
<grant>
<subject>
<grantee>
<name> Alice </name>
</grantee>
</subject>
<object>
<target>hospital_info.xml </target>
<path>//hospital/operation_info</path>

</object>
<type> p </type>
<access_right> Read </access_right>
<subject>
<grantor>
<name> Bob </name>
</grantor>
</subject>
<status> True </status>
</grant>
</rule:hospital>

which reads that the grantee Alice is granted by the grantor Bob the access right
read on Xpath specified object hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/
with the authorization type p and the status is set to True.

4.2

cangrant

Differing from grant, the predicate cangrant represents the capability of a subject in granting a right with respect to an object to another subject. Formally,
we define it as follow.

Definition 2. (cangrant) cangrant is a 4-tuple predicate S × O × A × F : <
cangrant, s, o, a, f > where s ∈ S is the grantor; o ∈ O = target + path(V, E),
target is an XML or DTD, path is an XPath expression that eventually selects
specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree, V is a set of nodes
and E is a set of edges; a ∈ A is an access right; and f ∈ F is the status of the
rule. cangrant determines whether a subject can grant an access right over an
object.

The definition above states that Subject s has the right to grant access right
a on object o to other subjects.
In APS, we define the cangrant as

<cangrant subject,target+path,access_right,status>
In DTD, cangrant is defined as follows:

<!DOCTYPE
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT

cangrant[
cangrant
subject
grantee
name

(subject,object, access_right,status)>
(grantee)>
(name)>
#PCDATA>

<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT

object
target
path

(target,path)>
href #PCDATA>
#PCDATA>

<!ELEMENT

access_right

<!ELEMENT
]>

status

(a*)

#IMPLIED>

(true|false) #REQUIRED >

The following is an example of cangrant in XML.
– rule in APS:
<rule:hospital>
<cangrant subject="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info",
access_right="Read",
status="True">
</rule:hospital>
– rule converted to XML:
<rule:hospital>
<cangrant>
<subject>
<grantee>
<name> Alice </name>
</grantee>
</subject>
<object>
<target> * </target>
<path>//hospital/operation_info</path>
</object>
<access_right> Read </access_right>
<status> True </status>
</cangrant>
</rule:hospital>
This rule states that Alice can grant the right read with respect to the object
//hospital_info + //hospital/operation_info
to other subjects.

4.3

Delegation

We define the delegation right d, which allows a subject who holds an access
right to grant the right to another subject. A subject can grant other subjects
an access right a over object o if the subject has an associated cangrant right
and
– s is the security administrator admin, or
– s has been granted a over o with delegable type d.
Clearly, the type d is a flag indicating whether or not the access right can be
further granted to another subject by the holder of the access right.
We also assume that if subject s receives a delegable authorization directly
or indirectly from another subject s0 on some object o and access right a, then
s cannot grant s0 authorization on the same o and a later on.
For example, Alice is granted an access right Read|Write of type p|d over
object
hospital info.xml + //hospital/operation info/,
then we have
– rule in APS:
<rule:hospital>
<grant, grantee="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p|d",
access_right="Read|Write",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">
</rule:hospital>
This rule implies that Alice can grant the access right with respect to o and a to
another subject. In other words, the list of rules can be updated whenever Alice
takes the action.
With rule:hospital and cangrant right,
<cangrant,subject="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info + *",
access_right="Read",
status="True">
A new rule can be generated by Alice (notice that Write access is forbidden):
<rule:hospital2>
<grant, grantee="Cindy",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Read",
grantor="Alice",
status="True">
</rule:hospital2>

where we have assumed that d denotes the non-inherited delegation. This means
that the delegatee Bob cannot further delegate the right to other parties. To
allow further delegation, we use the flag d+. If we replace d with d+, then we
have
<rule:hospital2>
<grant, grantee="Cindy",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p|d",
access_right="Read",
grantor="Alice",
status="True">
</rule:hospital2>
Thus, the access right is delegated to Cindy, who can then grant it to another
party.
4.4

Authorization Propagation

Our model supports the implicit authorizations by permitting rules propagation. A rule based authorization specification allows implicit authorizations to
be derived from the given authorization set. In APS, we give an explicit authorization set and they will derive implicit rules automatically by propagation.
Using authorization propagation can greatly reduce the size of an authorization
set.
Let S1 , S2 , · · · , Sn be n sets of subjects and O1 , O2 , · · · , Om be m sets of
objects. As we have described earlier about the partial order of our system,
subjects in Si , objects in Oi , and authorization rights satisfy the partial order
rule. The authorization propagation is based on the partial order rule.
In a set Si , the access right held by a subject with a lower order propagates to
the subjects with a higher order. For instance, in Si , Alice has the order of 2, Bob
has the order of 3, and the administrator has the order of 1; that is, Administrator
> Bob > Alice. If Alice can read the object o1 , then by authorization propagation
Bob and administrator can also read o1 . If Bob can read the object o2 , then
Alice cannot read o2 unless the administrator or Bob grants the read access
right to her. The administrator possesses the access right of Alice and Bob by
propagation.
For an object set Oi , the authorization associated with objects with a lower
order propagates to the object with a higher order. For instance, the descendant
of a node can be read by an user, then the node can also be read by this user.
Assuming //operation/files/patient is the object set with the partial order
operation > files > patient. If a subject who can read on patient can
also read files and operation by propagation.
For an access right set A with the partial order a1 > a2 > · · ·, if a subject
holds the access right with a higher order implies that it has the access rights
with a lower order. For instance, for a1 = Write and a2 = Read, if the subject
s1 has Write access to an object o1 , the then s1 also has the Read access to o1 .

Definition 3. (Propagation) Let (s, o, a) be a 3-tuple identifier which indicates
what the corresponding rule is about in terms of subject, object and access right.
If there exists a relation of s0 > s, o0 > o, a0 > a the rule with respect to (s0 , o0 , a0 )
could replace the rule with respect to (s,o,a). We say constant c is minimal in a
rule r with respect to the partial order “ > ”, if no constant c0 in r exists such
that c > c0 . We use cmin to define the lowest order in a partial order chain. Let
S={s1 > s2 > · · · > smin }, O={o1 > o2 > . . . > omin }, A={a1 > a2 > . . . >
amin }, E = {(si , sj , ak )}, I = {(si0 , oj 0 , ak0 ), i0 = 1 . . . i − 1; j 0 = 1 . . . j − 1; k 0 =
1 . . . k − 1; }. si , oi and ak are the authorization vocabularies in the partial order
chain.
Definition 4. (Implicit Rule) An implicit rule is defined with a rule and the
associated partial order of subjects, objects, access rights, and the propagation
rules given above, can be generated automatically.
In the following, we provide an example of propagation by using the sets:
– Subjects: Admin > Bob > Alice
– Objects: hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/
– Access rights: Read > Write
The explicit rule in APS reads:
<rule:hospital3>
<grant, grantee="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Write",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">
</rule:hospital3>
The implicit rules associated with rule:hospital3 and the partial orders
are automatically generated and described as follows:
<rule:hospital3>
<grant, grantee="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Write",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">
<grant, grantee="Alice",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Read",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">

<grant, grantee="Admin",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Write",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">
<grant, grantee="Admin",
target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/",
authorization_type="p",
access_right="Read",
grantor="Bob",
status="True">
</rule:hospital3>
Observe that Alice is also granted the Read access right and Admin is granted
with both Write and Read access rights.
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Conflict Resolution

Our model supports different types of access rights, authorizations can be in
conflict where a user is granted two different types of access rights. Thus a proper
conflict resolution policy is needed. We solve conflicts as follows. First, trace the
delegation relation path explicitly. When a conflict occurs, we will see if the two
grantors fall into a delegation path. If they do, then let the authorization with
the grantor as the predecessor in the path override the other one. In other words,
along the delegation path, the predecessors’ grants have higher priority than the
successors’ grants. This policy can support well-controlled delegation. Second,
if the conflicts can not be solved by the above policy, we will use Negativetakes-precedence based policy to resolve the conflicts. That is, we will resolve
the conflicts according to their types, and the priority sequence is n > p > d.
This policy favours security.

6

Conclusion

We have presented an access control model that supports fine-grained XML. Our
model has the following main merits.
– Simplicity in access control management. By introducing APS, the security
administrator needs only update the rules in the APS. These rules are defined with conciseness, so updating them is easy. The rules in an APS can
automatically be converted into XML which is readable to the normal XML
environment.
– Conciseness due to authorization propagation. We utilize partial-order rules
in APS which allow implicit rules. Implicit rules are obtained with the partial order of associated subjects, objects, and access rights and with normal/explicit rules. Implicit rules do not need to be described in the APS.
They can be converted into rules in XML automatically.

Our access control model makes the complex access control management much
more effective,simple and elegant.
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